Thursday, July 8, 2010

Robert Dahl, Procedural Democracy, Thoughtful Thursday

"Procedural Democracy" by Dr. Robert Dahl which appeared in Democracy, Liberty and Equality and Contemporary Political Philosophy--the latter which shows up in Google Books.

What procedures are necessary for democracy and who must have a vote or right to particpate?

Certainly, we need decisions to be made! But there are two types of decisions, rules and individuals. In the doctrine of rule by law, everything is a law. We have a tax code? In rule by sortition, each case is decided independently and we rely on the law of large numbers to remove the arbitrariness and to achieve some measure of consistency? If we always take a random sample of 1000 people and we present them with similar individuals This also resolves Dr. Dahl's claim that "equally valid claims justify equal shares." This is a tautology--Dr. Dahl admits it is close to one. we should not automatically decide cases in favor of a particular ethnic group. We claim that each person's claim is equally valid even though one person is from ethnic group A and the other from ethnic group Q. A bigot would say that group A is inferior to group Q and therefore, their claims are not equally valid and it is perfectly fine to rule against the first person solely because they are of ethnic group A.

And the binding decisions should be made by the members, directly or indirectly. And the members can delegate the rights to make decisons. Most of the times this is for convenience. That is the justification for representative democracy rather than having all decisions made by referendum. It is also the justification for administrative boards such as the Environmental Protection Administration at the Federal level or a planning board in a municipatlity. Many nations have generated certain powers to their constitutional court. This allows certain principles to be preserved, typically human or civil rights issues.

And Dr. Dahl said that citizens should have the right to set the agenda as well as vote. That is a major limitation in current systems, and one on which invention, research and implementation should be done to allow individuals together to create complicated legal codes. And of course, a sortition-based approach resolves this problem, as each case rather than a set of cases as defined by a law is brought individually.

Now who gets to vote, or from what pool do we choose the sortition jurors, or otherwise participate in the decison process. Should everyone affected by the decisions of an organization have a right to vote on them. We certainly have voluntary associations. They either invite and admit their own members--some cooperatives work that way. Before one can buy a share and live there, the coop board must screen you. Other organizations have non-discretionary admission process--if you pay the fee, you are a member and have a vote or professional organizations like the American Society of Mechanical Engineers or Institute of Electrical Engineers require a degree of other indicia that you are an engineer. They have associate members who pay dues but have limited voting rights (IEEE Constitution, online). The American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) has a similar arrangement where members must have eight years of experience as an engineer. This lack of democracy is not a major concern, an associate member aggrieved simply does not renew the folowing year.

Schumpeter suggested that every "demos" can define itself. Thus ethnic group A can govern and simply define that members of ethnic group B have no right to vote. That is what happened to the Cherokee Nation. John Marshall said that the Cherokee were in "a state of pupilage" and the relation "resembles that of a ward to his guardian" and he remarked that should a foreign prince attack the Cherokee, it would be considered as would any other invasion of the United States. Alexander Tocqueville watched one of the Choctaw removals-- he asked one of the Native Americans why they were leaving. He said to be free of American laws. So here is an example of a demos defining itself to affect those who got no vote. (Many Native Americans became United States Citizen by assimilating or by serving in the armed forces. And even after the 1924 law granting citizenship, it was not until 1948 that all had the right to vote.)

Related is the right of the conqueror to set up courts and the like. This was establidged in Hefferman vs. Porter which said that a Union military commander could set up a court in Tennessee. And these decisions would be binding.

Locke and Rosseau said that the Constitution must be approved unanimously, but then laws could be passed by only an approval. But unanimously by whom?

and of course, there is a question of Children. And there are others who might sufficiently developmentally disabled as to not understand the voting process. One might argue that all such wards would vote as their guardians or caregivers directed. But effectively that happens now. Each State is given representation in the House of Representatives proportional to their population. Thus the votes of those groups who have lots of children have more power in Congress than those groups that choose to practice more birth control. Would there thus be any harm in allowing young children or developmentally-disabled adults to vote, knowing full well that their parents would be pulling the lever "on their behalf."

And if we allow exclusion of the incompetents, is that a slippery slope to literacy tests for voting or to become a citizen?

And what about tourists? They are subject to the laws--but do not get a vote. Obviously in conventional elections, where the election is for a four year term, it is not fair to allow a person who just happens to be in the country that week to vote. And in a participatory democracy, it is in appropriate to allow a one-week tourist to vote on a plan to build a nuclear power plant whose construction would start well after they left and would exist for many years afterward. However, for continuous expenditures, there is no problem. Each person gets to cast their vote for the public expenditures on entitlement programs, the police department, etc. they prefer. They also enter their preference of tax rates. They enter all manners of preferences as to numbers, how many minutes busses can idle, the number of years in jail a burglar should receive, etc. All these nubmers are combined by a median to determine the rate. As new voters become competent, e. g., when they reach eighteen eyars of age, their number is included in the median calculation. When they die or lose their voting rights as a felon, their numbers are subtracted. There is no problem for the tourist. They could enter their numbers upon entry to the country and it gets subtracted when they leave at the end of their one-week vacation. If medians are used, if the tourists are very far from the "real citizens," then their numbers would not have much of an effect.

And there is a local question. Non-residents pay property tax. Non-residents pay income tax. New York City has a non-resident income tax. Yet these people do not have a vote. The owner of a business in a state is subject to the laws of that state--yet they certainly have no vote in that State And the blog raised the question, should a person possessing property in multiple states or cities have a vote in each, while a person ownly owning one home only get to vote in one locality. Dr. Bailey proposed many mechanisms in his proposed constitution for a future country that helps address these issues. A person possessing property or a business owner could file a Lindahl tax or a Thompson insurance to express their concerns. Yet since this costs them money, and would cost more money to do it inn three cities than one, it does not give unfair advantage to them.

And states and countries base their residency upon address or abode. This can be a permanent location to which one intends to return, even though one never set foot there. Thus, assume A is working in New York State. A's family moves from Nevada to Tennessee. A never was in Tennessee. But A does intend to join his loving family upon completin of his work project. A is a resident of Tennessee and can vote absentee out of Tennessee. And does a person who is in a state for several years to complete a project a resident? And we hear about countries setting up special polling places in the United States for their citizens who are displaced here.

And immigration is an issue. I proposed a system of panels and allocating of quota by median. A simple rule that might be added is, Noone is admitted into the country as an immigrant who does not receive fifty percent vote from a sortition panel.

Dahl mentioned that Rosseau considered Geneva and Venice as "true republics" but the demos was only a minority. In Venice it was 0.1% of the population.

For Future Thoughtful Thursdays:

"In the Courts of the Conqueror: The Ten Worst Indian Law Cases Ever Decided" by Walter R. Echo-Hawk.

Tuesday, July 6, 2010

Casino Economics

Cantor Fitzgerald, a famous bond and derivatives house, just set up a casino in Las Vegas. They are applying the same techniques that are used in setting up derivatives. It allows people to bet on sports results while the game is being played. This is different where people had to place their bets before the event started. I heard of the Casino Economics. Business Week had a famous article on Casino Society, that says that much of modern finance is nothing more than a game devoid of economic substance.

Thursday, July 1, 2010

Initiatives, Thoughtful Thursday

Shaun Bowler, Todd Donovan, "Measuring the Effect of Direct Democracy on State Policy: Not All Initiatives Are Created Equal" State Politics and Policy Quarterly Volume Four, Number Three, Fall 2004, pages 345 to 363.

States vary in

  1. how difficult it is to get an initiative on the ballot.
    1. Some states simply need more signatures
    2. there is little time to get the signatures. I. E. the people have to collect the signatures, e. g. between March Seventh and April Fourteenth
    3. One needs a specific number of signatures in each county. In other words, it is not enough just to get 100,000 signatures. For example, one must get at least 2000 in at least half the counties.
    4. Some states don't accept initiatives in all areas.
  2. And the Legislature may have some power:
    1. Worse in some states, the legislature can simply repeal the initiave by voting against it, sometimes immediately.
    2. States restrict initiatives to one item
    3. States limit the substance of the initiative
    4. some states only allow the people to vote on ordinary statues and not amend their constitution

As one would expect, these affect the number of initiatives per year. 1.58 versus 0.50. And the second set of restrictions is correlated highly (0.74) with the first set. And the states that added an initiative in the 1900's have initiatives easy to get on the ballot; the legislature cannot undo these. Other states added initiatives later but here the legislature can easily reverse the effect and worse, and they are hard to get on the ballot in the first place.

Drs. Bowler and Donovan looked at how closely the State abortion policy matched public opinion. The states that made it easier to get an initiative on the ballot had a policy that closer matched public opinion on this controversial question.

States that frequently used the initiative and states that made it easier to enact initiative and keep them in place, had stronger campaign finance policies.

And states that had a progressive initiative policy were more likely to have term limits on their state legislatures and to have stricter ones. Twenty-one states have legislative term limits. Twenty of these hd initiative policies! (I note that the Federal Government has no initiative and no legislative term limits.)

The point of this article is that making the initiative easy and not restricting it will have real effects on how it is used and will make the laws of the state reflect what the citizens want and not what the legislators want. Drs. Bowler and Donovan criticize earlier studies for simply looking at the initiative as an either-or proposition (a dummy variable in regression terms)--that is the point of the article.

Sunday, June 27, 2010

Jury Pay

Due to the recession, people are requesting an excuse for jury duty for extreme financial hard ship. That's because the fee is often ten or twenty-two dollars a day and if the person is self-employed, they cannot afford to lose a days work.

The ancient Athenians paid common citizens the equivalent of half a days wages for an ordinary laborer. They had to use rope to keep people away when too many came.

RBefore I became interested in participatory democracy issues, I always thought there should be two shifts of juries and courts. One would be the conventional nine to five. The other should be four hours a night during the week night plus eight to ten hours a day on the weekend--for those working conventional jobs that they could not afford to miss.

Friday, June 25, 2010

Private Equity sitting on half a trillion dollars, about to be wasted

Five Hundred Billion Dollars in Cash has been given to Global Leveraged Buyout Funds. It is sitting waiting for a good deal, buy an existing company at a hopefully low price. This money will not go to make one new windmills. It will not go to research new medicines. It will not build reliable electric distribution systems or water treatment plants for the developing world. The buyout companies are under pressure--if they don't buy something soon, the investors will feel, rightly, that their money isn't earning anything and walk away. If they under presure, overpay or buy a lemon...

Much of these funds are from Pension Funds and insurance companies. Others are from wealthy individuals. (I have not been able to get a percentage break down of the source.)

Source: The New York Times Thursday June 24th 2010, Page A1 and A3, CLIX, No 55081.

For a future Thoughtful Thursday, "The Economics of Private Equity Funds" Andrew Metrick, Review of Financial Studies Ayako Yasudo, 23(6), 2303 to 2341.

Thursday, June 24, 2010

Icelandic Crisis

Icelandic banks gave out a whole lot of loans in Kronurs that were in fact a currency speculation. Apparently, the Icelandic Court has ruled that the balance due is based on the amount in Kronurs. Iceland voters in an initiative rejected paying back their bail out. I since found a detailed article that showed that this was a rejection of a deal at one point and since the referendum was put on the table, another better deal was offered to Iceland. Thus the no was a foregone conclusion since the voters would not accept a deal when they were already offered a better one.

Thoughtful Thursday, a second Review of Constitution for a Future Country by Dr. Martin Bailey

Martin J. Bailey, Constitution for a Future Country, part Two

In Chapter Four, Dr. Baylor pointed out--as I have long felt--that when a new government was forming, the leaders were only given the U. S. Constitutions or the parliamentary system to serve as a guide. There has been no improvement in government for two hundred years. He recognizes that a country does not throw out its old Constitution and put in a new one just because logic or economic theory or public choice theory says this one is better. But when there is a situation like the collapse of the Soviet system in Eastern Europe or Afghanistan forming a new government, the leaders of the transition might ask for help looking for a better way.

Dr. Baylor wrote this book in his dying days to provide that help. It is my goal to provide this help also, but in the form of computer programs. We simulate things on the computer before we build them, whether it be the finite element analysis of a bridge resisting the forces of winds and the trucks riding upon them or the robustness of a electric grid as loads change and generators or alternative power sources upon them. The people who must ratify a constitution should be able to simulate it. Just as a pilot practices emergency moves such as an engine stall in a simulator, the people must practice dealing with budgeting during a depression, handling a natural disaster like Katrina. And the judicial system must be practiced as well. How would a one-state solution to the Palestinians and Jews in the Middle East deal with a Palestian Police Officer shooting an Orthodox Jew or the other way? A Law Enforcement class might enact a trial to learn criminal procedure. The people will first vote on a judicial code under a trial constitution. Then, they will have whatever election process that would include for judges. Then the judges and the jury, if their constitution so provides, will try moot cases. This would definitely include staged charged situation of one ethnic group shooting a member of the other. If they can't do it in a mock trial--is there any reason to believe they could accept the results when it happens for real. And we should do it in the more quotidian cases such as those that one might see in Judge Wapner's People's Court.)

As an economist, Dr. Bailey is very concerned that government expenditures are handled efficiently. And he starts with Lindahl taxes. Each possible group, doctors living in Wyoming, wealthy financiers living in tony Connecticut towns, coal miners in Apalachia, single people, married families, will be represented by random samples from their numbers. These will be chosen randomly, what Dr. Bailey refers to as a stratified sample. They will each propose a tax to fall on their group proportional to their marginal benefit. Dr. Bailey that each group can be divided into other groups. But each division would be based on some objective criteria, such as gender, race, occupation group, income or the like.

And taxes would be either based upon property or income and have a tax schedule. The taxes would be categorized by budget category. Thus, there might be a property tax on automobiles to fund the highway system. The goal is to get a near unanomous vote. Also, every two years, there should be the opportunity to vote for a minimal budget for basic public safety needs--equivalent to the partial shutdown of the government that were used during budget stalemates in some states.

As each funding proposal comes through, citizens vote their uninsured harm (VCG taxes) and also can purchase Thompson Insurance for monetary losses. Dr. Bailey proposes limits of about ten to twenty percent of income for these. This means there is no way for a citizen to express extreme concern-- for example a pro-lifer expressing extreme concern about legalized abortion, or a Native American expressing extreme concern about a mine on a sacred burial ground.

And Dr. Bailey proposes a complicated formula for legislative pay which includes a variety of incentives. (See below.) The first is at the start of the public good chain. If their estimate of Lindahl Dr. Bailey believes that legislators should be sequestered like juries in major cases. They should only get information in an organized way through formal hearings and not emotional impacts. More importantly, there would be no way to lobby legislators. Legislator's wealth would be replaced by a mutual fund weighted like theinvestments of their demographic groups. Thus, a physician representing his fellow physicians would sell their investments and be given a set of investments that matches what an average physician has. Cumulanis' Constitution (that's what Dr. Bailey calls his hypothetical State) specifies that legislators shall vote the amount of money they and their family would pay to put through or stop a certain legislature.

And Dr. Bailey believes in referenda, anyone including corporatins can put a referendum on the ballot if they pay the costss including evaluation. Dr. Bailey calls for impartial statisticians to estimate the possibility of referenda passing--I guess after polling. If the odds are ten percent ormore Obviously, there are various technical correction bills that are not controversial. The statistical groupo could find which ones have a 95% chance of passing and these could be grouped in a single up or down vote. He furthermore proposes that referenda be voted on twice, with the first vote just to see if there is interest and requires 25 per cent of the vote. If a legislature makes a proposal rejected by 75 per cent of the people shall have the costs of the ballot deducted from their incentive pay.

Of course legislators have important roles, including determining the size of ebverybody's taxes--although with his mechanisms less of a role than currently. But many other jobs including the election commissioners that administer the non-trivial software systems, the statisticians are critical. And, what about those making decisions about deep oil drilling equipment. Or those administering large contracts for the government.

Dr. Bailey realizes that the VCG mechanism although a Nash equilibrium is not immune to collusion. Cumulanis' constitution simply says that attempt to organize voters to misrepresent their harms that would defeat the nice economic properties of VCG taxes is a felony! Dr. Bailey notes that under the bill of Rights, it is perfectly legal to encourage voters to vote strategically, e. g. a citizen could take out adds encouraging Republicans to cross over and vote in the Democratic Party and vote to nominate an extremely liberal candidate so the Republican party candidate wins.

Dr. Bailey believes legislatures should be paid on a contractual basis with the voters who are sovereign. Thus, every bill should have measures of success. The education bill should state that 70% of the children shall read at grade level for example. The legislature making the education proposal would be responsible for contracting out the education function and monitoring it. If the education system got only 65%--then any citizen can sue them. "The criteria for standing admissibility of suits shall be identical to those for suits against private parties as specified by the laws of torts and contracts." Now, who would have the right to sue here. Would I as a taxpayer or simply a citizen who cared that kids get a good education or a professor who felt that I want students who know how to read and write in my class have the right to institute a suit? (The Supreme Court has restricted this right. Taxpayers do not have the right to pursue a generalized claim that their funds are being mispent. Parents of a particular ethnic group could not sue regarding giving tax exempt treatment to schools that discriminated against their children. And lastly individuals could not sue on behalf of animals under the Endangered Species Act. A generalized claim that the person might not see the animal when they are traveling is not sufficient.)

In the same article, Dr. Bailey proposes mechanisms to make budget estimates more accurate and realistic. Each tax schedule shall have an estimate of how much revenue it will bring in. (And he provides for macroeconomic downturns that are not the estimator's fault.) Legislators cold be sued when their budget estimates were simply incorrect--presumably discouraging the budget shenanigans we say at the state and federal level in the United States. (I have pointed out that there are ways of organizing the budgeting structure constitutionally without budget estimates. One specifies the tax schedule and whatever it brings in is what that government has. Also, one can specify an expense and the people who shall bear it. They compete on a goodness or badness basis before sortition jurors to determine who should pay it. For example, the car owners shall be required to pay for the highway expenses. Each goes before a tax sortition juror and pays a tax based upon how safe they drive, how much they needed to drive (those who lived on a farm out in the boonies might have no choice but to use their vehicle and the sortition jury would assign them a small share of the highway taxes. But someone who might use their vehicle when the Greyhound bus went where they needed to or who drived for vacations.)

One can also use approval voting to determine expenditures. That which 100% vote for gets funded first, then what 99% vote for, etc. The tax schedule brings in whatever it brings in. The things wanted by the most people gets funded first.

Thompson Insurance

A street project would improve the value of some people's property. It would lower the value of others. Every proposal would be associated with a Thompson insurance. The first parties could take out insurance against the proposal failing. The other parties would take out insurance against it passing. A neutral government body must offer this. Dr. Bailey cited work in the law and economics literature that insurance really doesn't work for intangibles such as pain and suffering. And a majority could keep proposing the same thing, bankrupting a minority. That is if the majority might keep proposing the mine on the ethnic group's grave field. The ethnic group would take out insurance against the bill passing, defeating it. However, they would eventually run out of money.

Thus, this really does not deal with the pro-life individual concerned about legalizing abortions or the pro-choice concerned about a proposal to restrict abortion. Dr. Bailey's constitution would have would have limits that would not allow a person to declare the severe harm for their ethical sensibilities. Dr. Bailey realizes this and he says that his mechanisms could not handle it. He says, "The performance of a country with our proposed constitution could be almost an arbitrary and capricious on this issue as the ... United States has been. That is a pity, and if the reader can think of a constitutional order that would arrive at sound policy on such issues more reliably than that proposed, please publish it." I have an idea--and will be posting it shortly here. I should also mention Dr. Bailey's concern about entry into war on spurious grounds. He mentioned the Gulf-of-Tonkin resolution that got the United States escalated in the Vietnam war and the less-disastrous Spanish American war. This book was published and Dr. Bailey passed away before the entry into IRAQ, a situation that has been compared. And Dr. Woodruff discussed the problem in the Greek invasion of Syracuse. system. (I proposed a solution of waiting to reward our statespeople and military leaders.)

Appendix -- Incentives for Legisltuares

Section Eleven includes detail for all legislators. Here are some of the formulas to give a flavor: "0.1 percent of the budget amount contained int he proposal plus thirty percent of the total declared insured and uninsured harm from non-adoption, net of the declared harm from adoption, relative to the next most valuable distinct and differeent proposed by another legilature, less five percent of the net inferiority of these proposals, relative to distinct and different alternatives of the ballot, for each population that on net would have supported an alternative proposal int he group, under the legislature's proposed taxes and accurate taxes for the alternative."